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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent, :
Case No.
14539

-vsKEITH S. BROOKS,
Defendant-Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with a violation of Section
76-7-302, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended), to wit:
aggravated robbery.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried by a jury before the Honorable
Thornley K. Swan of the Second Judicial District, State
of Utah, and found guilty as charged.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the conviction.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the twenty-first of June, 1975, at approxirsately
10:30 p.m., appellant entered the Circle K Food Store
in Bountiful, Utah.

The proprietor, Barry Godw"

behind the counter.

Appellant pulled out a

style hand gun and demanded money (T-35,36).
Godwin complied and appellant turned to go.

As

left the store, appellant walked past a Gary Brow
was entering the store to make a purchase (T-9 6) .
On the day following the robbery both of the
witnesses were shown, separately, six

i:

mug-shotsfl of

black individuals and were asked to see if one was the
robber.

Both men picked out the picture of appellant

and said they were sure (T-20,98).
At trial appellant called, as an alibi witness,
his girlfriend who testified that appellant was with
her in Ogden at the time of the robbery.

Also appellant

called another women, a checker in a store in Ogden, to
testify that appellant made a purchase at the store at
the time of the robbery.

On cross-examination however,

this second alibi witness stated that shortly before
trial several of appellant's friends accosted her and
threatened her if she did not help apoellant (T-260).

~2~

At trial, during voir dire of the jury two
prospective jurors testified that they knew a prosecution
witness.

Both, however, stated that they could lay

aside any feelings and render an impartial verdict
based solely and squarely on the merits (Partial
transcript p. 8) .
As the jury was being polled as to their verdict,
one juror had to be asked a question thrice before
answering.

He indicated that he did n0t hear very

well (Partial transcript p. 11). Defeijise counsel,
however, failed to object, make an exception, or
question the juror to see if he had failed

to hear

any of the testimony.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
A. THERE WAS NO ERROR COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT
IN SUPERVISING JURY SELECTION.
Appellant challenged two jurors for cause.
trial court denied the challenges.
appeals that decision.

The

Appellant now

Respondent submits that the

decision of the trial court should be affirmed for
any one of four reasons.

Firstf a trial judge necessarily

has broad discretion in which to make decisions concerning jury selection.

Thus his judgment should be
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given great weight by the appellate court.

Secondf

respondent submits that the trial judge acted
correctly.

Third, all of the questions raised on

appeal concerning the possibility of a biased jury
have already been answered negatively by the jurors
themselves.

Finally, appellant has not carried his

burden on appeal in that he has failed to show that
any actual prejudice resulted from the trial court
decision.
It should be first noted that a trial judge is
granted broad discretion in handling a trial (Barber
V. Calder, 522 P.2d 700 (Utah 1974), and particularly
as he conducts the selection of a jury (State v. BeBee,
110 Utah 484, 175 P.2d 478 (1946), State v. Narten,
407 P.2d 81 99 Ariz. 116, cert, denied 384 U.S. 1008
86 S.Ct. 1985, 16 L.Ed2d 1021 (1965)). The trial judge
has the prime responsibility to determine facts and to
judge the credibility of the statements made by prospective jurors (State v. Brosie, 540 P.2d 136, 24 Ariz.
App. 517 (1975)1. The trial judge has the opportunity
of seeing the jurors, hearing their answers to voir
dire, and noting their manner and demeanor while under
examination.

Thus, he is m

the best position to deter-

mine whether or not a challenge for cause is factually
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justified* It is much more hazardous for an appellate
court to attempt to make such a determination.

The

trial court particularly should not be overruled in
a case such as the instant one where the prospective
jurors specficially answered all questions concerning
prejudice with negative answers (State v. Barary 25
Utah 2d 16, 474 P.2d 728 (1970)).

There are certainly

no "overwhelming reasons" (BeBee, supra) requiring
reversal.

In fact, the court's determination should

not be overturned unless an abuse of discretion appears
In re Minney' s Estate^ 216 Kan. 178, 531 P. 2d 52
(1975), State v. Cutnose, 87 N.M. 300, 532 P.2d 889
(1975), State v. Brose, supra, (Ariz. 1975)).

This

is particularly true in this case wher^ appellant
failed to show any actual prejudice resulting from the
lower court's decision (See discussion, infra p. 10 ).
Second, respondent submits that there was no
abuse of discretion by the trial judge under the law*
Appellant complains that prospective juror Moore knew
a prosecution witness.
lished:

During voir dire it was estab-

(1) That Moore lived down the street from the

witness (P.T. p.2); (2) that Moore and the witness
met occasionally at church activities (P.T» p.2);
(3) that Moore would not give

that witnesses* testimony

any undue weight because of the relationship (P»T. p.2);
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(4) that Moore might have some feelings that he would
like to see the witness receive whatever was just
under the facts (P.T. p.3); (5) that Moore could set
the relationship aside and try the facts squarely OB
the merits (P.T. p.8). (Moore was also asked if he
would be comfortablef if he were the defendant, with
a juror such as himself.
was cut off by defense

He started to answer but

counsel (P.T. p.5).

Appellant also complains that prospective
juror Ward knew a prosecution witness.

During voir

dire it was established: (1) that Ward was a very
good friend of the witness (P.T. p.3); (2) that Ward
worked in a bank with the witnesses' wife {P.T. p.3)r
(3) that Ward and the witness would occasionally visit
in each other's homes (P.T. p.3); (4) that Ward's
husband also knows the witness (P.T. p.3); (5) that
Ward talked with the witness outside the courtroom
before trial and without discussing anything at all
about the case (P.T. p.6); (6) that Ward would be
fair and would consider the facts (P.T. p.6); (7)
that Ward would not give the witnesses' testimony any
more validity than she would other witnesses (P.T. p.6);
(8) that Ward would set the relationship aside and
judge the case squarely on the merits without bias
or prejudice (P.T. p.8).
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Respondent submits that from the facts established
through voir dire there is no legal balsis for a challenge
for cause.

Appellant would have prospective jurors

excused simply because they were acquainted with a
witness.

This is not the law in Utah, and it is

amply demonstrated by reference to the case of State
v. Baran, 25 Utah 2d 16, 474 P.2d 728 (1970).

Justice

Callister, speaking for a unanimous Coiirt, said thats
"Section 77-30-18, Utah Code Ann.
1953, provides that a particular
cause of challenge is: (1) for
implied bias, and (2) actual bias,
which is defined as a state of
mind on the part of the juror which
leads to a just inference tljtat he
will not act with entire impartiality.
Section 77-30-19, Utah Code Ann. 1953,
enumerates the sole grounds upon
which implied bias may be alleged,
none of the grounds asserted by
defendant falls within this catagory.
Section 77-30-21, Utah Code Ann.
19 53, provides: * * * In a challenge
for actual bias the cause stated in
section 77-30-18 (2) must be alleged;
but no person shall be disqualified as
a juror. . . provided it appears to
the court, upon his declaration under
oath or otherwise, that he can and will,
notwithstanding such opinion, act
impartially and fairly upon the matters
submitted to hiitu (25 U.2d 16 at 19) .
(Emphasis added).
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As is evident from the foregoing language,
appellant, to prevail, must either show implied bias
or actual bias on the part of prospective jurors Ward
and Moore.

Section 77-30-19 lists the sole grounds

allowed by lav; in Utah for implied bias.

Nowhere does

that section say that a person may be excused because
he is acquainted with a witness.
bias is given in 77-30-18(2).

The rule on actual

That section is likewise

legally unavailable to appellant sinc€> it provides that
no person may be disqualified if he will swear under
oath that he will be impartial and fair, which both
Moore and Ward did.

Therefore, the trial court correctly

ruled, under Utah law, on appellantfs challenges for
cause.
Respondent would further like to list some cases
wherein actions similar to those of the trial court
in the instant case were upheld.

In C.R. Owens Trucking

Corporation v. Stewart, 29 Utah 2d 353, 509 P.2d 821
(1973) the Utah Supreme Court said:
"At the conclusion of the
examination counsel for the plaintiff
challenged for cause nine members
of the panel on the grounds that
they were acquainted with the
defendant and also on the basis
they were [were in the same
business]. . . the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in not removing from the panel the jurors
challenged." (29 U.2d at 355).
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In State -. Brosie, 24 Ariz. App. 517, 540 P.2c 136
(1975), the Arizona Court of Appeals said:
"It is true that Mr. Roglers knew
the prosecutor by sight. This however is insufficient to shota he was
prejudiced. . .Mr. Rogers bpinion
that police officers have bbtter
access to facts is also insufficient
to show prejudice, especially in view
of his expressed willingness to
follow the courts instructions and
determine the credibility of each
witness according to the raqts or
the case." 540 P.2d at 140.
See also Smithey v. State, Okl.Cr. 385 P.2d 920 (1963)»
State v. Clayton, 109 Ariz- 587, 514 Pf2d 720 (1973),
and In re Estate of Minne£/

2 1 6 Kan

- 178, 531 P.2d

52 (1975), for the proposition that it is not proper
grounds for a challenge for cause to simply allege, without more, that a prospective juror simply knows a witness.
Third, the questions raised on appeal concerning
the possibility of a biased jury have already been
answered negatively by the juror themselves.

Appellant

questions whether or not the two prospective jurors,
Ward and Moore, could give "the same impartial consideration to the testimony of all witnesses! appearing before
the court."

(appellant's brief, p. 13). Both answered

that they could (P.T. p. 4/5,6).

Appelllant also questions

whether the two could set relationships aside and decide
the case on the merits.

Both testified they could

(P.T. p.8). Obviously the trial court had no gounds
for sustaining the challenges•
-9-

Finally, appellant has not carried his burden
on appeal in that he has failed to show any actual
prejudice resulting from the trial court decision.
Neither Ward nor Moore actually sat on the jury in
this case.

Without a showing of prejudice, any

error must be deemed harmless.
535 P.2d 82 (Utah 1975)).

(State v. Winkle,

Appellant alleges that

there was prejudice claiming that there is a
possibility that he might have had a better jury if lie
had not had to use his peremptories on Ward and Moore.
He, in effect, asks this court to speculate as to
what would have happened if the trial court had
granted his challenges.

Respondent submits, on the

other hand, that the question before this court is
simply:

was appellant tried by an impartial jury.

The issue is not whether he could have had a better jury
or what would have happened

if. . . .

The Utah

Supreme Court has said that it will not be convinced by
"rebulous assertions

without any substantial, believable

or factual probative substance," such as those now
made by appellant.

(Mayne v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 195,

468 P.2d 369 (1970)).
Respondent submits that appellant has utterly
failed to show any prejudice as a result of the jury
that actually tried him.

First, there is no claim

by appellant that he used all of his peremptories.
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(For example see State v. Brinkman, 6$ Utah 557,
251 P. 364 (1926), and more recently, State v»
Bautista, 30 Utah 2d 112, 514 P.2d 530 (1973), which is
quoted infra.

See also People v. Miller, 78 Cal.Rptr.

449, 71 C.2d 459, 455 P.2d 377 (1969) and State v.
Paxton, 201 Kan. 353, 440 P.2d 650 (1968).

In both

of these latter cases an appeal was m^de to the United
States Supreme Court, however, certio^ary was denied
as reported in 406 U.S. 971, 92 S.Ct. 2417, 32 L.Ed.2d
672, and 393 U.S. 849, 89 S.Ct. 137, ^1 L.Ed.2d 120
respectively.

Further see People v» Simmons, 183

Colo. 253, 516 P.2d 117 (1973), and sqott v. State,
Okla.Crim. 538 P.2d 1061 (1975), as authority for the
same point.
Therefore, since there is no allegation that
appellant used all his peremptories, t|his case is
identical to State v. Bautista, supra.], wherein a
defendant challenged a prospective jurpr which challenge
was denied.

When the issue was raised on appeal the

Utah Supreme Court said:
"No claim is made by the
defendants that by reason of the
court's failure to excuse tjhe
prospective juror they were
compelled to use a peremptory
challenge they might have uped
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to strike another prospective jurorfs
name from the list." (514 P.2d at 532).
Therefore the court went on:
"Defendants fail to show that
any prejudice resulted to them
by reason of the court's failure
to grant their challenge for cause."
(Id.).
Respondent submits that the Bautista decision is
controlling.
Secondly, there is no claim in appellant's appeal
that any biased jurors actually sat on the jury, nor
are there any facts that could conceivably be used
to support such an allegation.

Therefore, there

is no showing of actual prejudice.

Appellant has

merely raised possibilities of hypothetical prejudice
and thus his conviction should be affinned.
B.

APPELLANT HAS WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO AN APPEAL

BASED ON A JUROR'S ALLEGED DEAFNESS.
Appellant would have this court reverse the
conviction on the grounds that one of the jurors
had an alleged hearing problem.

Appellant cites

one minor instance as his sole proof of this allegation.
The court asked a question of one of the jurors.

That

juror asked to have the question repeated twice before
he answered, saying "I don't hear too good."
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(P.T. p.11).

Respondent submits that there is no proof that
the juror was incompetent or that he massed any
testimony during the trial.

The general rule is

that a juror is not disqualified per s0 because of
deafness (Saffran v. Meyer, 103 S.C. 3^6, 88 S.E. 3
(1916), but only if the deafness is to such a degree
that he didn f t hear material testimony (Commonwealth v.
Brown, Penn. 332 A.2d 828 (1974).

In tjtie instant case

there is no proof that the juror missed any material
testimony.
The burden is on appellant to proye that the
juror was not competent to sit.
been carried.

This burden has not

The rule is that any objections to a

juror because of disqualification is waived by failure
to object until after the verdict.

(People v. Lewis,

180 Colo. 423, 506 P.2d 125 (1973); Bear} v. State, 86
Nev. 80, 465 P.2d 133 (1970), cert, denijed 400 U.S. 844,
91 S.Ct. 89, 27 L.Ed.2d 81; Higgins v. Commonwealth,
287 Ky. 767, 155 S.W.2d 209 (1941); Lind|sey v. State, 189
Tenn. 355, 225 S.W.2d 533 (1949)).
Since appellant failed to register an objection
or exception at the time of the incident], and since
appellant railed to ask any questions of the juror
concerning whether or not he had any trouble hearing
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during the trial, appellant has failed to give this
Court any basis for his claim of prejudice.

There

is, therefore, no grounds for reversal.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE AGAINST THE APPELLANT IS SUFFICIENT
TO SUSTAIN THE VERDICT.
Appellant argues on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to convict him.

Respondent

submits first, that there is more than sufficient
incriminating evidence, second, that appellant fails
in his burden on appeal in this issue, third, that
appellant is doing nothing more than arguing weight
and credibility, which are both questions for the
trier of fact.
The prosecution put on two eye witnesses to
establish that appellant was the man who robbed the
store in Bountiful.

Appellant, as his defense, called

his girlfriend and another woman to testify that
appellant was in Ogden at the time of the robbery.
Therefore, the entire question in this case was which
of the witnesses to believe.

Appellant argues that

since he had good alibi witnesses, that as a matter
of law, this court must reverse.
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Respondent submits that the test is found
in the case of State v. Mills, (Utah 1&75), 530
P. 2d 1272.

The Utah Supreme Court the£e said:
"For a defendant to prevail
upon a challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence to sustain his conviction, it must appear tha-j: viewing
the evidence and all inferences
that may reasonably be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable
to the verdict of the jury, reasonable minds could not believe him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
To set aside a verdict it must
appear that the evidence was so
inconclusive or'unsatisfactory that
reasonable minds acting fairly must
have entertained reasonable doubts
that defendant committed thQ crime."
(530 P.2d 1272).

Respondent further submits that as the evidence is
examined in the light most favorable tc} the jury
verdict, it becomes impressively obvious that the
conviction should be sustained.
The proprietor of the store was s|hown a group
of six mug-shots on the day after the rjobbery.

He

very strongly indicated that a certain [photograph was
of the man who robbed him.

That was a photo of the

appellant (T-20) . He said, "If that's hot him, its
his twin brother."
m

(Id). In addition, a customer

the store at the time of the robbery was shown the

same photos on a separate occasion.
out the picture of appellant

-15-

(T-98).

He also picked
JEn addition

to this eyewitness evidence, there was other circumstantial evidence of guilt.

Appellant put

on an alibi witness that testified that she saw
appellant in Ogden at the time of the robbery.
The testimony of this witness was thoroughly discredited
however by further testimony that a group of appellant's
friends paid her a visit before trial and threatened
her if she did not help appellant (T-260).

Finally,

although appellant had an alibi at trial, when he
was arrested and questioned he did not, implying
that the alibi was a fabrication (T-226-228) .
Applying the law to this case, it is obvious
that appellant has failed to show that the evidence
was so "inconclusive and unsatisfactoiry" that
reasonable people would not have convicted him.
The jury simply, and with good reason, chose to
believe the eyewitnesses rather than the alibi
witnesses.

Respondent submits that it was the jury's

prerogative to resolve disputed testimony State v.
Kelsey, (Utah 1975), 532 P.2d 1001.

The rule is that

when evidence conflicts, the judgment of the trier
of facts as to the credibility of the witnesses is
determinative, Stare v. Harris, 2 5 Utah 2d 3 65, 439
P.2d 1008 (1971).

The jury is in the best position
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to do this, since they can see the witnesses, listen
to their tone of voice, and note their manner and
demeanor while being examined.

Their determination

of the facts should be upheld.
CONCLUSION
Since there was no error in the nfanner in
which the jury was selected, and since there was
no prejudice as a result of the jury wl^ich actually
sat on this case, and further, since the evidence
was sufficient to justify conviction, t|he verdict
must stand.
Respectfully (submitted,
VERNON B. ROMJSIEY
Attorney General

WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake Cit^, Utah

84114

Attorneys for Respondent
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